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A definitive history of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) has yet 
to be written. But when it is eventually constructed, this history might 
situate the PSB as a major force in the institutionalization of information 
programs designed to shape beliefs and behavior. Through its almost 
invisible activities, the PSB, as a subcommittee under the aegis of the 
National Security Council (NSC), coordinated programs and operations with 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), U.S. State Department, branches of 
the military, and other federal agencies involved in psychological warfare 
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(Central Intelligence Agency 1951d, 1951g).1 “Psywar,” as one declassified 
text of the period describes, is the “communication of messages, whether 
expressly or by implication” (Schramm, Katz, Kendall, and Vallance 1953, 
11). On the other hand, “modern psychological warfare” is outlined as a 
tool for managing empire, not for settling conflicts in any fundamental 
sense. It has operated largely as a means to ensure that indigenous 
democratic initiatives in the Third World and Europe did not go “too 
far” from the standpoint of U.S. security agencies. Its primary utility 
has been its ability to suppress or distort unauthorized communication 
among subject peoples, including domestic U.S. dissenters who 
challenged the wisdom or morality of imperial policies. (Simpson 1994,
8)2 
Secrecy, Gaps in the Historical Record, and the PSB
The PSB, as the behind-the-scenes coordinator of psychological 
warfare activities during the years 1951-1953, exemplifies the oft cited 
“secrecy is a form of government regulation” (Commission on Protecting and 
Reducing Government Secrecy 1997). Secrecy as a parallel form of 
government manifests through specific information policies, and in the case 
of the PSB, resulted in a dearth of public knowledge on its relationship with 
the NSC 10/5 Panel (Keane and Warner 2007, 257), Hoover's FBI, the 
National Military Establishment,3 the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating
Committee (SANACC), the Joint Chiefs, and NATO (Department of Defense 
1952b). Secrecy also cloaked knowledge of PSB's role in psychological 
warfare operations on a domestic scale. For example, the Board's 
relationship with social scientists in Cold War operations (Psychological 
2
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Strategy Board 1952e; Price 2016),4 knowledge of the CIA's University 
Associates Program, established in 1951 (Cook 1983, 34), and CIA front 
organizations and publishing houses (Price 2016) are not widely known.5 The
role of PSB's Panel D psychological programs in shaping the “most favorable 
psychological effects from the public reporting” of atomic, chemical, 
biological and nuclear weapons (Psychological Strategy Board 1952j, 1952a, 
1952c; Terms of Reference 1952) is under-researched. PSB's actions, if any, 
when approached by CIA to exploit information on unidentified flying objects,
which “appear to have implications for psychological warfare as well as for 
intelligence and operations” (Smith 1952a) are not known. Question abound 
regarding the PSB's role in early iterations of Operation Mockingbird6 and its 
relationship with the press (Parry Giles 1996)‐  and Rockefeller Foundation, 
the “founding fathers of communication research” (Gary 1999, 88).7
However, the subject of this article concerns another critical gap in the 
literature: the PSB's knowledge of the CIA's clandestine scientific research 
and development into behavior, addiction, drug interactions, interrogation 
techniques, sleep, and hypnosis carried out under the BLUEBIRD, 
ARTICHOKE, and MKULTRA programs.8 To better accommodate the wide 
range of primary materials related to the PSB, CIA, and clandestine projects,
this article is divided into distinct sections that can be read as independent 
histories or in unison with other sections. First discussed in this case study is
the role of NSC 10/5 as a foundation for examining the PSB as a member of 
3
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the invisible government, defined as “a loose, amorphous grouping of 
individuals and agencies drawn from many parts of the visible government” 
(Wise and Ross 1964, 3). The research literature is then reviewed concerning
the PSB, CIA, and secret projects. Building on this background, I chart the 
creation of the Board, then report on inconsistent information policies that 
deeply influence, some sixty-five years after the fact, historical 
reconstruction of PSB's activities. Lastly, I focus on PSB's knowledge of, and 
participation with, three more well-known CIA clandestine projects, 
BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOKE, and MKULTRA. Through this investigation, I 
establish that information policies, including “island” secrecy led to the 
Board's fragmentary understanding of project budgets, planning, and 
operations.9
NSC 10/5, PSB, and the CIA
The underlying basis for my exploration of the PSB are based in 
questions regarding the National Security Council's policy directive 10/5. This
directive authorized the PSB “to assure that its strategic concept for a 
national psychological program includes provision for covert operations” 
(National Security Council 1951; Lay 1951; Warner 1994; Central 
Intelligence Agency 1967). The once classified 10/5, titled Actions Taken by 
the National Security Council on the Scope and Pace of Covert Operations 
dated October 23, 1951, directed the PSB to participate in covert operations 
4
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by
a. Determining the desirability and feasibility of programs and of 
individual major projects for covert operations formulated by or 
proposed to the Director of Central Intelligence.
b. Establishing the scope, pace, and timing of covert operations and 
the allocation of priorities among these operations.
c. Coordinating action to ensure the provision of adequate personnel, 
funds, and logistical and other support to the Director of Central 
Intelligence by the Departments of State and Defense for carrying out 
any approved program of covert operations. (National Security Council 
1951)
Gen. Walter B. Smith noted in the Memorandum From Director of 
Central Intelligence Smith to the National Security Council that NSC 10/5 
redefines the Central Intelligence Agency’s responsibilities in a field 
which was probably not envisaged at the time the National Security Act
of 1947, under which the Agency was established, was framed. This is 
the field of cold war covert activities, including guerrilla warfare. We 
have accepted these responsibilities as agents for the major 
Departments concerned and for projects which are approved by the 
Psychological Strategy Board. (Keane and Warner 2007, 252) 
An additional memo, dated May 7, 1952 titled Briefing to the 
Psychological Strategy Board on Some 10/5 Problems, outlines the 
relationship between the PSB, State and Defense departments, and CIA's 
Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) on covert actions (Keane and Warner 
2007, 257-265).10 Although NSC 10/5 seemingly directs PSB involvement in 
CIA's covert programs, Barnes (1982, 656) describes the Board's oversight 
role as giving “nominal approval,” and further fleshes out guidelines for such 
approval:
5
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There was thus considerable concern that clandestine operations were 
consistent with American policy abroad, but because any action 
capable of interpretation as bruising communist interests was thought 
to fit in this category, the freedom given for covert operations was 
considerable.11
Using 10/5 to explore the PSB and its knowledge of CIA's BLUEBIRD, 
ARTICHOKE, and MKULTRA is risky business, but it is not without foundation.
The three CIA programs operated in secret to support clandestine and covert
operations; furthermore, a read of NSC 10/5 does not differentiate between 
approval for support programs versus actual field (both covert and 
clandestine) operations. For example, MKULTRA is described as “the principal
program for CIA development of chemical and biological agents which were 
to be 'capable of employment in clandestine operations to control human 
behavior'” (Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities 1976a, 389). On my part, these distinctions
are a launching point to explore PSB's membership in the invisible 
government as well as any involvement in the BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOKE, and 
MKULTRA programs.
A Review of the Literature: PSB and Genealogy
 The PSB, as a U.S. government based propaganda machine, reflects 
the dynamics of Cold War messaging in showing “how the practice of 
international relations was no longer the preserve of governments and 
foreign policy elites, but required the mobilization of entire populations” 
6
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(Rawnsley 1999, 2).12 As the “nerve center for strategic psychological 
operations” (Psychological Strategy Board 1951j), the PSB is deeply 
connected to more contemporary projects that alter beliefs and opinions, and
in essence, social reality.13 The PSB laid the institutional foundation for the 
development of initiatives to exploit, destabilize, and manipulate, as well as 
mold opinion, beliefs, and allegiances. For example, deception operations 
(Macdonald 2007), influence operations,14 information operations (Brown 
2003), information warfare (Molander, Riddile, and Wilson 1996), military 
information support operations (formerly termed psychological operations), 
perception management /public diplomacy (Cull 2009; Lord 1998; Snow 
2009, 2010), strategic communication, and strategic influence are all the 
direct result of decades long social sciences research (Chomsky 1989; 
Daugherty and Janowitz 1958; De McLaurin, Rosenthal, and Skillings 1976) 
with their roots in the PSB as the interagency clearinghouse for psychological
warfare (Memorandum For: Acting Assistant Director for Policy Coordination 
1951; Briefings on Research in the Social Sciences 1952).15 
As Scott Lucas (1996, 330) points out, “in the thousands of volumes on
the United States and the Cold War, there is scarcely a mention of the PSB 
and the few passing references are dismissive.” A research gap generally on 
the PSB substantiates Lucas' observation, but it is the Board's connection 
with CIA's BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOKE, and MKULTRA projects that is lost history.
For example, the hearings of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public 
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Welfare, Subcommittee on Health held September 10, 12, and November 7, 
1975, paved the way in disclosing information on the BLUEBIRD and 
ARTICHOKE projects. With the release of declassified documents the 
Commission obtained through FOIA, the country learned of once-secret 
budgets, contracts, experiments, and internal audits, such as CIA Inspector 
General J.S Earman's (1963) redacted Report of Inspection of MKULTRA 
(Marks 1979). There is no mention of the PSB in these particular hearings.
The subsequent 1975 Church Committee changed the trajectory of 
knowledge concerning BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOKE, and MKULTRA in terms of “a 
wide range of intelligence abuses by federal agencies, including the CIA, FBI,
Internal Revenue Service, and National Security Agency” (United States 
Senate n.d.). While the Committee described the PSB as an “NSC 
subcommittee established in 1951 to determine the desirability of proposed 
covert action programs and major covert action projects” (Senate Select 
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities 1976a, 627), it did not differentiate between the Board and its 
successor, the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). The Committee 
reported that “during the first two years of the Eisenhower administration, 
1953-54, 66 projects were approved by the DCI in coordination with the 
Operations Coordination Board or the Psychological Strategy Board” (Senate 
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities 1976a, 56). Note here the PSB was abolished on 
8
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September 2, 1953 with Eisenhower Executive Order 10483; we are left to 
ponder why the Church Committee did not differentiate between the short 
months of the PSB under Eisenhower and its successor, the OCB, regarding 
the sixty-six reported projects and specifically PSB's connection with 
BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOKE, and MKULTRA. These projects, discussed in Book 1 
of the Church Committee hearings, are primarily associated with the CIA, 
and do not mention PSB's involvement. Here it is critical to interject that 
researchers and the media have not had complete access to Church 
Committee records as a select group remain classified.16 
A final hearing, the 1977 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
altogether neglected the PSB and its possible participation in the BLUEBIRD, 
ARTICHOKE, and MKULTRA programs. The hearings are nonetheless notable 
for the remarks of then CIA Director Adm. Stansfield Turner, who observed 
that his testimony does “not tell the story; they tell pieces of it” (Senate 
Committee on Human Resources 1977, 128).
Although journalists and scholars have made remarkable strides in 
unmasking the utter complexity of the BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOKE, and 
MKULTRA programs (Scheflin and Opton 1978; Marks 1979; Thomas 1989,  
Hunt 1991; Cannon 1992; Ross 2006; Brown 2007; McCoy 2007; Streatfeild 
2007; Albarelli 2009, 2013; Moreno 2012; Jacobsen 2014; Krishnan 2017), 
few associations are made to PSB's knowledge of the three programs. In 
turn, those works that do examine the PSB often do not link the Board to the
9
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clandestine projects we are concerned with in this article (Paddock 1982; 
Warner 1994, 2014; Lucas 1996; Hixson 1997). Christopher Simpson's 
(1994) seminal Science of Coercion: Communication Research and 
Psychological Warfare, 1945-1960 outlines the evolution of U.S. 
psychological warfare during the years 1945-1960, but offers limited insight 
into the relationship between PSB and CIA. Simpson attributes his brief 
mention of the PSB to issues with security classification and scattering of 
records across archives. Since the publication of Science in 1994, these 
factors have lessened due to declassification initiatives and availability of 
digital collections. Simpson's (1994, 4) framing of psychological warfare as a 
“communication device” however, is especially relevant to the PSB's 
programs in terms of the “relationship between the production of 'knowledge'
- in this case preconceptions about communication and coercion - and the 
social and political conditions of a particular era.” 
This article therefore is a step towards bringing the hidden history of 
the PSB to the surface. To accomplish this task, and in institutional 
ethnography fashion, I borrow from Dorothy Smith (1990, 62) the “realities 
to which action and decision are oriented are virtual realities vested in texts.”
The primary materials documenting PSB operations during the years 1951-
1953 offer a chronology of events, are a diary of information control, and 
reveal political tensions between PSB staff and member agencies exposing 
the energetics of power/knowledge. In examining these texts, however, we 
10
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must address Georg Simmel (1950, 352) on the publicity-bearing influence 
of writing, especially the notion that writing is “opposed to all secrecy” and 
“possesses an objective existence which renounces all guarantees of 
remaining secret.” Simmel, who gave us profound insights into secrecy 
across the social landscape, did not distinguish between degrees of 
concealment in institutions; his friend and colleague Max Weber filled in the 
blanks on the territorialization of information/knowledge within bureaucratic 
institutions. We must confront Simmel's assumption, keeping in mind that 
neither the act of “writing” nor its dissemination in the form of texts (e.g., 
memorandum, document destruction schedules) equates to total publicity or 
transparency. Redaction, or the blacking out of information deemed 
sensitive, is one such example where Simmel falls flat. Redaction is nothing 
less than a side effect of the national security state, obscuring individuals, 
conversations, dates, relationships, and policies. These elements are critical 
to evidence building and central to accountability. Many, if not most, 
materials cited in this article contain some level of redaction. Redaction 
conceals writing.
Through primary materials preserved at the Truman and Eisenhower 
presidential libraries, declassified in the CIA's CREST database, which 
includes documents from presidential libraries under the RAC program,17 the 
MKULTRA Collection at Black Vault, National Security Archive's Briefing 
Books, the subscription database U.S. Declassified Documents (formerly the 
11
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Declassified Documents Reference System), and documents I received 
through FOIA, it is possible to partially (re)construct the PSB's knowledge 
and involvement in the once-black BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOKE, and MKULTRA 
projects. Primary materials allow us to place the PSB more concretely under 
the lens to scrutinize its ethics, inner politics, bureaucratic relationships, and 
ideological differences (Wolfe 2000); the documents cited in this article are 
also a vehicle in which to peer into the national security complex, which gave
wide berth to the meaning and application of psychological warfare. 
I theorize here that broad definitions of psychological warfare gave 
license to studies that included “brain warfare,” sensory deprivation, 
interrogation, the study of specific drugs on behavior, and the active search 
for a “truth serum” (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 1977, 25-33). 
That is, I speculate that psychological warfare was extended out from the 
realm of propaganda and modification of public opinion to the active research
and development of numerous chemicals and drugs (Drugs n.d.; MKULTRA 
Briefing Book n.d.), technologies (e.g, ECT, polygraph), and interventions 
(e.g., isolation, sleep deprivation) in order to unlock methods to alter 
agency, behavior, consciousness, and in some cases, break minds and spirits.
The specter of these programs exists today in the use of techniques that 
concern the manipulation of information to “create consent” (Lippmann 1929
[1922], 248) and invent “positive misinformation” (Friedrich 1972, 177), as 
well as in the development of certain neurotechnologies (e.g., fMRI, 
12
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transcranial magnetic stimulation) and “neuropharmacological interventions” 
(Dubljević and Racine 2017). The R&D conducted under the BLUEBIRD, 
ARTICHOKE, and MKULTRA programs institutionally set the stage for 
“enhanced interrogation” techniques (McCoy 2007; Brown 2007; Price, 
2007a, 2007b, 2016),18 perhaps even “neurowarfare” (Krishnan 2017), as 
requisites for protecting and strengthening national security, indeed what is 
characterized as “neurosecurity” (Moreno 2012). 
In this way, PSB's knowledge of CIA black programs with the 
cryptonyms BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOKE, and MKULTRA is critical U.S. social 
history, and therefore of genealogical concern. As I see it, genealogy as it 
relates to the PSB, the CIA, and clandestine projects, concerns a “vision of 
critique as an inquiry into those historical conditions of possibility that 
constrain us not with the iron fist of necessity, but with the gentle yet 
persuasive arm of contingency” (Koopman 2013, 19). To unlock the 
genealogical footprints that involve the rot of secrecy and national security is
to peel away the edges of authority, democratic right to know, and ethics. 
More often than not, the double-edged sword of national security is used as 
justification for initiating, conducting, and funding secret R&D programs, with
this same claim applied as a basis for concealing details from friends and 
foes alike. The testimony of Dr. Sidney Gottlieb to the Senate Subcommittee 
on Health and Scientific Research captures this dual edged nature of national
security secrecy. Gottlieb, former Director of the CIA's Technical Services 
13
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Staff's (TSS) Chemical Division, which conducted R&D into hallucinogens, 
poisonous plants, and biological and chemical agents, reflected on these 
aspects of secrecy. Gottlieb notes that harnessing the 
academic and research community of the United States was an effort 
to provide badly needed answers to some pressing national security 
problems, in the shortest possible time, without alerting potential 
enemies to the U.S. Government's interest in these matters. (Senate 
Committee on Human Resources 1977, 172)
A Moment in Time: The PSB and Institutionalization of Psywar
Following the document trail, a proposal for National Psychological 
Board (NPSB) was initiated by the U.S. State Department January 14, 1950 
(U.S. Department of State 1950; Barrett 1950; Lilly 1951). The board, as the
State Department inventoried the body, authorized the Secretary of State for
“coordinating informational and psychological strategy to meet situations 
wherever joint action by more than one agency of the Government is 
required in this field” (U.S. Department of State 1950). NSC 74, A Plan for 
National Psychological Warfare, written by Under Secretary of State James 
Webb in July 1950, “recommended that a national psychological warfare 
organization be established. Pursuant to this recommendation and to NSC 
59/1, the Department of State announced on August 17 the creation of a 
National Psychological Strategy Board under the Secretary of State” (Keane 
and Warner 2007, 20, 99). NSC 74 “never received the formal approval of 
the Council, but was used for reference in subsequent studies of this subject”
(Keane and Warner 2007, 21). Planning discussions for the new board 
14
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continued throughout 1950 (Keane and Warner 2007). By January 18, 1951, 
the Draft Directive on the National Psychological Effort outlined the board's 
composition, which included assigning it under the purview of the NSC 
(Keane and Warner 2007, 87-88). In February, 1951, a subject paper, which 
originated in the Executive Office of the President, echoed this organizational
placement of the PSB, where the “mission of the Board under the terms of 
the paper would be solely related to national strategy and policy in the field 
of psychological warfare (propaganda)” (Johnston 1951).19 This policy paper 
also raised the matter of CIA providing “intelligence support” to the new 
NPSB/PSB (Central Intelligence Agency 1951a; Central Intelligence Agency 
1951b). Out of these and other discussions, the Psychological Strategy Board
was born. The Presidential Secret Directive of 1 April 1951 Establishing a 
Psychological Strategy Board gave bureaucratic life to the PSB (Psychological
Strategy Board 1951b). An April 4, 1951 date is also given as the Board's 
establishment (Psychological Strategy Board 1951e) with the White House 
publishing an “abbreviated” version of the Directive on June 20, 1951 
(Truman 1951; Keane and Warner 2007, 120). 
Between the months of April and June, the matter of PSB's 
organization was the subject of back and forth discussion between agencies. 
A planning memo, Implementation of the Presidential Directive of April 4, 
1951 (n.d.), outlined the “recruitment of a really competent staff”; 
anticipating the October 23, 1951 NSC 10/5, “policy guidance for covert 
15
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operations is of concern to more than one department, this guidance be 
coordinated and issued to the CIA by the new Psychological Board” (Wisner 
1951). However, in May 1951, the PSB was darkly characterized by DCI 
General Walter B. Smith as “something that should be entirely independent 
of an altruistic agency” (Central Intelligence Agency 1951f). DCI Smith 
further conceptualized the PSB as a body that would provide policy guidance 
for CIA on covert actions. As the Church Committee notes in its hearings, 
Smith called for NSC restatement or redetermination of the several 
responsibilities and authorities involved in U.S. covert operations. More
importantly, Smith proposed that the newly created Psychological 
Strategy Board provide CIA guidance on the conduct of covert 
operations. The NSC adopted Smith's proposal making the 
Psychological Strategy Board the approval body for covert action. The 
body that had been responsible for exercising guidance over the CIA 
had received it from the DCI. (Senate Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities 1976b,
35)
In part, the PSB was perceived as a “general staff for the direction of 
the cold war” (Little 1954, 39) with Presidential Directive 128 serving as the 
North Star for the coordination of psychological operations (Truman 1951). 
Per the Directive, the Board reported to the National Security Council, staffed
by members such as “the Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, or, in their absence, their 
appropriate designees” and “an appropriate representative of the head of 
each such other department or agency of the Government as may, from time
to time, be determined by the Board” (Truman 1951). Membership in the 
PSB was based on the perception that
16
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its members would be men who enjoyed such prestige that the 
operating agencies would consider guidance approved by the Board as 
being mandatory. This was justified on the basis that the major 
psychological operations are conducted by either the Department of 
State, the Department of Defense, or the CIA, the undersecretaries of 
which (or the director in the case of CIA), constitute the membership 
of the Board. (Little 1954, 21)
Early in its formation, concern was voiced “that the scope of the 
Board's responsibility is very broad and covers every kind of activity in 
support of U.S. policies except overt shooting and overt economic warfare” 
(Psychological Strategy Board 1951b). The CIA too pondered its relationship 
with the PSB. The Agency found the PSB “represents potentially one of the 
most effective elements of the Government to assist CIA in the prosecution 
of the activities held responsible in NSC 10/2,” but argued the Board's 
activities should be “broad enough to encompass the group of Governmental 
activities having psychological impact” (Central Intelligence Agency 1951d).20
More to the point, the PSB
must be permitted to come to grips with the operational and planning 
problems of the agencies whose activities it is coordinating to a far 
greater extent than has previously been accomplished at this level in 
the government. (Central Intelligence Agency 1951d)
In this same memo, CIA recognized “the extreme value of PSB to CIA 
interests,” although it had “security and propriety” concerns for the Agency 
(Central Intelligence Agency 1951d). The CIA proposed a set of 
security/secrecy measures for the PSB that ranged from recycling personnel 
through special matter panels to limiting information to “absolutely 
necessary and need to know” (Central Intelligence Agency 1951c).21 
17
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The PSB in Action
At an August 13, 1951 meeting, the PSB's organizational structure was
finalized to include the creation of three offices: Office of Plans and Policy, 
Office of Coordination, and Office of Evaluation and Review (Psychological 
Strategy Board, 1951h, 1951i; Johnson 1951). In order to “execute its role,” 
the Psychological Strategy Board (1951f) stated that it would “formulate and
promulgate overall policies, programs, and objectives for psychological 
operations; including overall strategic plans in such detail as to enable 
operational planning by departments and agencies.” By September, the 
proposed number of PSB staff consisted of 42 officers and 57 supporting 
administrative and clerical positions (Psychological Strategy Board 1951e). 
Gordon Gray was the Board's first director.22 In June 1951, The New York 
Times described the PSB as central in formulating “strategy against Russian 
communism in all but military operations” (Waggoner 1951). And as 
previously mentioned, the October 1951, NSC 10/5 institutionalized PSB's 
position in relation to CIA-run operations.
In response to the establishment of the PSB and psychological 
operations as specified in NSC Memorandums 10/2, 10/5, and 59/1, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) published the 1952 DoD Directive C-5132.1, 
titled Organization, Office of Psychological Policy (Gough 2003, 11). This 
directive established the Office of Psychological Policy, led by Deputy for 
Psychological Policy, 
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formally known in Defense parlance as the Deputy Assistant to the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs – Psychological 
Policy. DoD signaled the importance it gave this new office by 
specifying in the directive that the Deputy for Psychological Policy 'shall
have direct access to the DoD member of the PSB on matters 
pertaining to PSB and to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Affairs on other matters.' (Gough 2003, 11)
PSB funding originated through equal contributions of $188,000.00 
from CIA and the Defense and State Departments (Houston 1952), with 
projected staff for 79 permanent positions for fiscal years 1952 and 1953 
(Gray 1951; Psychological Strategy Board 1951d).23 The January 1952 
Memorandum for Record: Legislative Problems of the Psychological Strategy 
Board includes CIA concern that its secret “activities in the psychological 
warfare field may be dragged into that Subcommittee.” With some candor as 
to budgetary entanglements and political alliances, the Agency observed: 
We have just succeeded in getting CIA clear of such subcommittees 
with the assistance of the Bureau of the Budget and our committee 
friends. From our point of view it would have been preferable to lump 
the PSB administrative budget openly as a part of the budget of the 
National Security Council, of which PSB might be considered an 
adjunct. This device would have had the advantage of bringing all of 
the PSB funds under the purview of the Armed Services Appropriations 
Subcommittee, and Chairman Mahon and Senator O'Mahoney could 
then have controlled the situation to a greater degree. (Houston 1952)
In March 1952, CIA responded to PSB Director Gordon Gray's 
recommendation to make the Board's Report to the President public. In spite
of any potential capital that might be gained from release of the Report, CIA 
was reticent to have its contents disseminated as it may be 
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too revealing of sensitive information and relationships which in some 
particulars are invidious and provocative - more apt to stir up discord 
than to produce harmony - and, therefore, to be deleted...the report 
infers a number of inter-agency differences and disputes that would 
not improve with public airing. Moreover, portions of the report would 
invite undeserved and unwarranted criticism of the Government - 
criticism for having done a great deal less than is actually the case in 
the realization of the need for and the development of machinery to 
carry out psychological warfare measures. (Central Intelligence Agency
1952d)
Additional materials from this time period also indicate concern over 
the physical control and custody of information. For example, Tracy Barnes, 
who at different times assumed the role of PSB Deputy Director and Acting 
Director, reported that he kept sensitive documents locked in his office safe 
(Psychological Strategy Board 1952g). Other correspondence between PSB 
and CIA illustrate tight control over documents (Psychological Strategy Board
1951a, 1953a), with one CIA memo informing PSB that "reports of the 
various members shall be made available to the others except on matters 
affecting the security of CIA operations. The CIA member may make his 
report available only to the Chairman and, in the field, to the - [redacted]” 
(Psychological Strategy Board 1952a). A June 9th memo from Allen Dulles 
(1952) to CIA Deputy and Assistant Directors further records ongoing 
segregation and control of information.
 Although the PSB fell under the aegis of the NSC, it did not have a 
representative on the Council. Gordon Gray recommended the director of 
PSB hold a seat on the NSC, but it was not deemed “desirable” (Smith 
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1952b). This led to “disputes” between the CIA and PSB, and “denied the 
representation he deemed vital to achieving a coordinated psychological 
offensive, Gray resigned in May 1952 as PSB director after less than a year 
on the job” (Hixson 1997, 190). 
Beginning of the End
In the June 21, 1952 Memorandum for the Chairman, Psychological 
Strategy Board, President Truman (1952) wrote that he was giving 
“consideration” to amending the April 4, 1951 Directive that established the 
PSB. By June 30, the President’s Committee on International Information 
Activities (1952, 60) opined that the “national information program has 
suffered from the lack of effective central direction...in spite of the 
establishment of the Psychological Strategy Board...and various agencies 
have largely gone their separate ways.” The President's Committee, or 
Jackson Committee after chairman Deputy Director of the CIA William H. 
Jackson, found “the present conception of the Psychological Strategy 
Board...unsound,” and critically observed the PSB was “charged with 
planning, coordination, and evaluation of 'psychological operations,' a term 
which is nowhere adequately defined.” The Jackson Committee 
acknowledged “so much controversy between PSB and the established 
planning agencies within the State Department” that it recommended the 
Board be “abolished” (President's Commission 1952, 89-90).24 It is 
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interesting to note that Gordon Gray was a member of the President's 
Committee and a contributor to the report (President's Commission 1952; 
Gray 1973). 
 In the strongly worded – and contemporary - August 1, 1952 Status 
Report on the National Psychological Effort and First Progress Report, the 
PSB turned the tables on the concept of psychological. With its sharp 
analysis, we are left to question the behind-the-scenes events that led to the
Board's commentary. I leave this investigation to future researchers, but find
the following passage from the PSB's Status Report astounding in its critical 
assessment of U.S. foreign policy: 
Certain national policies of the United States are psychologically 
damaging in various areas of the non-Soviet world. In the Moslem 
world this is true of United States policy toward Israel; in areas under 
European domination it is true of United States acceptance of the 
colonial policies of its NATO allies; in Britain and elsewhere it is true of 
United States policy toward China. The same may be said of certain 
primarily domestic matters. For instance, efforts to counteract 
communist exploitation of the race relations problem in the United 
States have not been fully successful. Likewise, the restrictive 
immigration policy of the United States, most recently embodied in the 
McCarran Act, has damaging psychological repercussions abroad. 
(Psychological Strategy Board 1952f)
In early 1953, it appeared business as usual for the PSB and its 
interagency coordination of psychological warfare activities. The January 
Handbook on Psychological Strategy Functions and Procedures describes the 
PSB as responsible for “psychological strategic planning,” with the State 
Department supplying Board staff “appropriate intelligence research 
materials and various types of policy information as requested” (McWilliams 
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1953). Newly elected Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953; Central Intelligence 
Agency 1953a) wrote to Acting Director George A. Morgan on March 5, 1953 
requesting that Special Assistant to the President C.D. Jackson be granted 
membership to the PSB.25 On March 19, James Reston (1953) of The New 
York Times announced that Jackson had assumed leadership of the Board.26 
By September 2, 1953, Reorganization Plan No. 8, 1953 (67 Stat. 642)
established the United States Information Agency, which the Church 
Committee notes assumed the functions of the PSB. According to the 
Committee, the Eisenhower administration found “a need for improving the 
manner in which NSC policies were carried out” and so created the 
Operations Coordinating Board (Senate Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 1976c, 
251). With Executive Order 10483 Establishing the Operations Coordinating 
Board (September 2, 1953), the final blow felled PSB as a psychological 
warfare coordinating body, with its projects transferred to the Operations 
Coordinating Board. 
PSB's Legacy
PSB's international information activities included manipulation of 
public opinion and the press within foreign countries (Simpson 1994), as well
as staff testing psychological warfare methods overseas in order to influence 
foreign politics (Wisner 1952). PSB programs included psychological 
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operations during the Korean cease-fire (Psychological Strategy Board 
1951k); PSB was also involved in psychological programs planned to lead to 
the “reduction of Communist power in Italy” (Psychological Strategy Board 
1952i) and France (Psychological Strategy Board1953e). A staff study on 
psychological operations in Southeast Asia (Psychological Strategy Board 
1952d), “a plan for coordinated psychological operations” in Thailand 
(Psychological Strategy Board 1953d), and psychological operation plans in 
the Middle East (Psychological Strategy Board 1952b, 1952d) were also part 
of the Board's global outreach. Defeating the former Soviet Union through 
“doctrinal (ideological)” warfare (Psychological Strategy Board 1952e) was 
the paramount strategic goal. Psychological warfare efforts focused on such 
methods such as exploiting information on refugees from the Iron Curtain 
(Action 1951) and the “Soviet orbit” (Psychological Strategy Board 1951g, 
1952d), as well as conducting “preparatory work” in anticipation of Stalin's 
death (Psychological Strategy Board 1952f; Lucas 1996). The PSB left its 
mark on U.S. psychological warfare policies through conferences on 
psychologically-oriented “evaluation techniques and criteria (e.g., with the 
Evaluation Branch of OGPW, with CIA, and at the Fort Bragg Psywar Center” 
(Psychological Strategy Board 1953d) and advising agencies on “psychiatric 
warfare.”27
In the wake of its termination and the creation of the OCB, the PSB 
was described as being “premised on the fallacious concept of an 
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independently-existing psychological strategy” (Cutler 1956, 448). Walter L. 
Hixson (1997, 190) goes further to observe the Board “failed to achieve its 
goal of uniting the executive branch, State, Defense, all branches of the 
military, CIA, Congress, the Bureau of Budget, academic specialists, and 
corporate interests behind a campaign of psychological warfare.” In an 
interview reflecting on his time on the PSB, Gordon Gray (1973) linked OCB's
administrative roots with the Board, observing “the PSB had been the 
necessary, although wobbly, precursor to the OCB. I think we couldn't have 
had an effective OCB without the experiences of the PSB, but that may be 
rationalization.”
Murky Projects + Information Policies = History in Pieces 
In this portion of my discussion, I identify significant problems that 
hinder the ability to document historical connections between the PSB, CIA, 
and the BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOKE, and MKULTRA programs. These problems, 
or institutional barriers, constrain research and thus have a bearing on the 
ability to fully document PSB and CIA relations. These barriers range from 
declassification/redaction and continuing classification, to limited copy 
policies and compartmentalization, the latter an interconnected practice 
where secrecy is not only concealment, but containment and segmenting of 
information and communications. As Lewis Mumford observes (1970, 264), 
“the key to exercising arbitrary power is to restrain the communication of 
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individuals and groups by subdividing information.” Additional institutional 
barriers include deliberate destruction of documents, lack of uniform 
indexing, and unevenly followed preservation policies.
 First, there is no doubt that declassification, or the downgrading and 
public release of formerly classified materials, is a significant tool in revealing
the underlying forces behind government policies and events.28 Under this 
regime, however, information is doled out in bits and bytes over the course 
of decades, as in the case of the JFK assassination files.29 The declassification
process often creates a screen between partial and full knowing. In the case 
of the PSB, seventy percent of documents are partially declassified and have 
only minimal redaction; 9,200 pages of materials remain classified in whole 
or in part at presidential libraries, documents otherwise open for research in 
the Truman and Eisenhower presidential libraries.30 The status of still 
classified or partially declassified PSB documents held by CIA is currently 
unknown. 
Lack of official records is another barrier to research. In its second 
meeting (August 13, 1951), the PSB agreed that it would “meet only when 
there are important problems to discuss” (Psychological Strategy Board 
1951f). From July 2, 1951 through January 15, 1953, only seventeen sets of 
declassified, redacted minutes are available for examination. Limited 
availability of official minutes makes internal correspondence between PSB 
staff and agency members even more significant in capturing the history of 
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the Board's interagency relationships and policymaking.
 Limited copy policies are another institutional barrier. These policies 
are tied to compartmentalization as an official secrecy mechanism. As it 
relates to the PSB, a limited copy policy is documented in a memo titled 
Psychological Strategy Board: Top Secret Documents, which describes types 
of Psychological Strategy Board (n.d.) publications often issued in the single 
digits. CIA memos of the same time period were also subject to a limited 
copy policy. CIA Inspector General J.S. (John) Earman's account of the 
MKULTRA program substantiates a limited copy policy. Earman reports 
“minimum documentation in keeping with the high sensitivity of some of the 
projects,” and following the limited copy policy, restricted his report “of the 
MKULTRA program in one copy only, in view of its unusual sensitivity” 
(Earman 1963, 1). A variation of the limited copy policy is not producing any 
documentation (Earman 1963, 8). Working in tandem with limited copy 
policies, compartmentalization restricts knowledge to privileged parties. For 
example, IG Earman describes “just two individuals in TSD who have full 
substantive knowledge of the [sic, MKULTRA] program and most of that 
knowledge is unrecorded” (Earman 1963, 5-6).
 Deliberate destruction of documents through official and informal 
policies is still another institutional barrier to research and historical 
reconstruction. A document titled List of PSB Documents Destroyed, dated 
September 22, 1952, not only inventories specific titles of documents 
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destroyed but the number of copies. For example, the “working draft” of 
copies 16-18 of the Psychological Strategy Plan Prescribing Specific Courses 
of Action with Respect to Soviet Harassment of Berlin is reported destroyed 
along with eight additional copies. In essence, these details are a metric that
is useful to information professionals and researchers concerned with 
preservation and the writing of history.
During the Church Committee hearings, the existence of CIA's rule CSI
70-10 "retirement of inactive records” regulation was revealed. As reported 
in the hearings, the regulation is characterized as an official agency 
preservation policy, 
not a matter of convenience or of storage but of conscious judgment in
the application of the rules modified by knowledge of individual 
component needs. The heart of this judgment is to ensure that the 
complete story can be reconstructed in later years and by people who 
may be unfamiliar with the events. (Senate Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities 1976a,
404)
But as the Church Committee learned, “retirement” was not a uniformly 
followed by CIA; document destruction was instigated by individuals 
associated with compartmented projects. During the Senate Committee on 
Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Health hearings, then CIA 
Deputy Director Carl E. Druckett revealed that destruction of MKULTRA 
records was informally approved by DCI Richard Helms:
Mr. Druckett: I can only tell you that the information that we have, in 
fact, uncovered suggests that documents were destroyed by the 
individuals who were directly involved in the program on instruction 
from Dr. Gottlieb.
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Senator Kennedy: And you do not know who gave him the instruction?
Mr. Druckett: The indications are in the handwritten note of one of the 
individuals who was involved, that he was told by Dr. Gottlieb - he did 
not personally hear this – that Mr. Helms, the [sic, CIA] Director at the 
time, gave him the instruction. (Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, Subcommittee on Health 1975, 280)31 
It is interesting to note the Advisory Committee on Human Experimentation 
(1995, 646) reports (emphasis added) that records were “substantially 
destroyed at the direction of then-Director of Central Intelligence Richard 
Helms in 1973.” The wholesale destruction of these records by secret “island”
parties within CIA indicates that information policies were not universally 
followed for documents considered embarrassing and/or potentially criminal; 
furthermore, select individuals close to classified projects decided the fate of 
records. The destruction of project records, as the Church Committee 
identified, “made it impossible” to identify, locate, and provide followup care 
to unwitting individuals of CIA experimentation. Furthermore, as the 
Committee observed, records destruction
made it impossible for the Select Committee to determine the full 
range and extent of the largest CIA research program involving 
chemical and biological agents...finally, it prevented the Committee 
from determining the full extent of the operations which made use of 
materials developed in the MKULTRA program. (Senate Select 
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities 1976a, 404)32
 
The destruction of those inventories documenting destruction of 
records is yet another barrier. During its investigation, the Advisory 
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Committee on Human Experimentation (1995, 795) found that “records 
documenting the destruction of records had been lost or destroyed.” 
Destruction schedules are crucial discovery tools used by researchers to 
confirm identities, dates, and interagency communication, the necessary 
ingredients of any federal agency history. Although redacted, the 
Memorandum for the OSD Classified Mail and Records: Subject Destruction 
of Classified Material, dated October 30, 1951, called for the destruction of a 
document on Project ARTICHOKE and requested a “Certificate of Destruction 
furnished to the CIA” (Central Intelligence Agency 1951c).33 This document 
reveals important details such as number of copies (2 of 5), dates (May 15, 
1952), and agencies with access (Secretary of Defense, including Army and 
Navy, and CIA's TSS, or Technical Services Staff). A suite of records attached
to the Memorandum indicate that the “Staff Study on Special Interrogations 
(Project ARTICHOKE)” was scheduled for destruction; also attached is a 
BLUEBIRD document, an archival rarity that indicates the concurrency of the 
BLUEBIRD and ARTICHOKE projects. This latter memo reveals additional 
details of significance, such as the U.S. Army, Fort Belvoir having access to 
TSS information and the use of the “Third Agency employee,” bureaucracy 
speak for the Third Agency Rule. The Rule, used here in 1952, prohibits one 
agency from sharing and/or disseminating materials originating from another
agency (the third agency) without the consent of the originating agency. This
detail is central to establishing agencies with security access and those “who 
30
Secrecy and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2 [2018], Art. 6
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol1/iss2/6
knew what and when” questions.
Still another barrier to research is the problem of records segregated 
from an agency's main indexing system. In August 1977, eighteen boxes 
labeled Project ARTICHOKE were located by CIA that were not part of the 
Office of Security (OSI) file index. After review, CIA determined that only 
fourteen boxes actually contained materials on ARTICHOKE. Among the 
items discovered were a “one ampule of Thorazine...a display board 
containing sample samples of several drugs – some of which then being 
studied (redaction). The boxes also held a “crudely fashioned automatic 
injection device” tested by CIA (Central Intelligence Agency 1977b). Director
of Security Robert W. Gambino wrote that “it was presumed that the material
had not previously been reviewed during the Congressional inquiries into 
Agency drug-related activities” (Central Intelligence Agency 1977b). One 
reason for this lack of review may stem from CIA's then archival practices, 
where files called “convenience or working files” were not “readily retrievable
because they are not official records and they are not indexed as such” (as 
cited in Theoharis 1984, 68). Along these lines, Dr. Robert Lashbrook raised 
the issue of “control files” in his testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Scientific Research of the Committee on Human Resources.34 A troubling 
exchange between Lashbrook and Senators Edward Kennedy and Richard 
Schweiker revealed CIA's use of a technique termed “boilerplate” or “cover 
file,” which Lashbrook describes as a type of records camouflage invoked for 
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secrecy-security purposes. Lashbrook informed the Committee that “what 
was actually signed off on was not the same as the actual proposal, or actual
detailed project” (Senate Committee on Human Resources 1977, 111). In 
other words, cover files or boilerplates were “not revealing of their 
substance” (Senate Committee on Human Resources 1977, 111).
As outlined here, these institutional information barriers add up to a 
less than ideal means to (re)construct the history of an agency's secret 
programs and operations. Moreover, the particular barriers discussed here 
are catastrophic in terms of their influence on trust in an agency's 
competence to conduct public business, even if that business is conducted in 
secret. In some cases, these barriers also present a challenge for those 
federal officials, who decades after the fact, are left as apologists for actions 
in which they did not participate or have knowledge of, yet remain 
responsible for interpretation of policies and the historical record.35 This finer 
point is illustrated in the dialogue between Dr. Sayre Stevens, Carl E. Duckett
of CIA, and Sen. Edward Kennedy during the hearings of the Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Health (1976, 
272-3):
Dr. Stevens: In an effort to simulate conditions, the Agency worked 
through the Bureau of Narcotics from perhaps 1953-1963 to test the 
effects of certain drugs including LSD, on unwitting subjects in social 
situations. The details of this testing are not in our records, but it 
appears that individuals were administered drugs, without their 
knowledge in normal social situations, to study their behavior. No 
follow-up or monitoring was normally possible. This program began in 
1954 or perhaps 1953 at one location and was expanded to another 
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location in 1961.
Senator Kennedy: Is this 1953? My copy says 1955.
Dr. Stevens:  I think in checking the records again we have an 
indication that something was going on by February 1954 so it could 
have been 1953. 
Mr. Duckett: That was a change we made this morning, and it was 
made because we found indications we had not previously see on this 
subject.
Senator Kennedy: What records are these?
Mr. Duckett: I have a document dated 10 February 1954, and it is that 
document that suggests certainly something was going on at the time, 
and therefore, we can presume it may very well have started as early 
as 1953. 
With these interconnected barriers in mind, below I report my findings 
on PSB's relationship with CIA's BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOKE, and MKULTRA 
programs.
PSB and the Projects: BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOKE, and MKULTRA
Without acknowledging projects, in 1975 CIA recounted its turbulent 
history of Cold War experimentation. In its remarks – that illustrate the 
double-edged nature of national security secrecy - CIA divulged that thirty 
universities and research centers participated in its projects:
By 1953, this activity led to the establishment of a fairly large and 
complex external research program which ranged from basic research 
on Lysergic Acid and other compounds to extensive testing and 
experimentation. More than thirty different universities and institutions
were involved in this program. Basic work included chemical studies, 
tissue studies, and toxicological investigations. Testing on animals and 
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human volunteers then followed. There was by this time a growing 
body of technical literature on the effects of LSD on humans. As the 
program developed, new materials and techniques for influencing 
behavior were also investigated. A significant feature of this effort was 
the use of covert funding techniques to protect the nature of our 
foreign intelligence concerns. (Central Intelligence Agency 1975b, 5)
Through FOIA requests most likely submitted by John Marks, just two 
years later, new records on clandestine projects were discovered by CIA. The
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (1977, 3) describes the records as 
detailing “a far more extensive series of experiments than had previously 
been thought. Eighty-six universities or institutions were involved.” At the 
Senate Select Committee hearings, CIA Director Stansfield Turner 
inventoried the institutions to approximately 44 colleges and universities, 15 
research, facilities or private companies, 12 hospitals/clinics, and 3 penal 
institutions, including the Pennsylvania based Holmesburg Prison (Marks 
1979, 160; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 1977).36 The CIA, 
according to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (1977, 3) “...used 
university facilities and personnel without their knowledge. It funded leading 
researchers, often without their knowledge.”  
Outlined below are brief accounts of the BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOKE, and 
MKULTRA programs, with special emphasis placed on PSB's knowledge. The 
three projects should not necessarily be thought of as chronological as often 
reported in the popular and scholarly literature. Instead, I ask readers to 
visualize a simple Venn Diagram where projects overlapped and intersected 
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for moments in time, often reflecting evolving political agendas, shifting 
policies, and in some cases, comparable research and development projects 
between agencies, researchers, and institutions. 
Project BLUEBIRD (1949-53)
The precise inception date for the BLUEBIRD program is lost to the 
ravages of documents destruction, but one report dates the project began as
early as 1949 (Chamberlain 1975) and continuing to at least November 1953
(Central Intelligence Agency 1953a). Surviving BLUEBIRD documents exist 
by way of John Marks (1979) who received them under FOIA. These 
declassified documents are present in digital format in CIA's CREST, the U.S.
Declassified Documents database, and Black Vault's MKULTRA Collection.37
It is theorized the BLUEBIRD program grew out of human 
experimentation by Nazi physicians and scientists (Marks 1979; Advisory 
Committee on Human Radiation Experiments 1995b; Price 2016; also see 
Pross 1991) who were captured or surrendered to the Office of Strategic 
Services and U.S. forces at the end of WWII under Operation or Project 
Paperclip (Hunt 1991; Jacobsen 2014; Loftus 2010). Sidney Gottlieb frames 
Project BLUEBIRD in an alternate way, stating that “as I remember it, was 
also an Office of Security concept, possibly never realized, which later 
evolved into a TSD-sponsored activity looking into brainwashing, and 
ultimately included the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology” 
(Senate Committee on Human Resources 1977, 170). 
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However, surviving documents reveal that BLUEBIRD was clearly more 
than a “concept.” BLUEBIRD “established a behavioral control program within
the CIA in close collaboration with the Office of Scientific Intelligence, but 
also made use of the BLUEBIRD's research results through the interrogation 
teams operating across the CIA” (Marks 1979, 23). That is, Project 
BLUEBIRD provided for the “immediate establishment of interrogation teams 
for the operational support of OSO [Office of Special Operations] and OPC 
activities” (Director of Central Intelligence 1950). BLUEBIRD had a strategic 
national security focus in 
(a) discovering means of conditioning personnel to prevent 
unauthorized extraction of information from them by known means,
(b) investigating the possibility of control of an individual by 
application of special interrogation techniques,
(c) memory enhancement, and
(d) establishing defensive means for preventing hostile control of 
Agency personnel. (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 1977, 
67) 
At the end of 1950, former OSI officer Morse Allen became head of the 
BLUEBIRD program (Jacobsen 2014, 318). In a undated memo titled Project 
BLUEBIRD, Col. Sheffield Edwards (n.d.) called for a meeting on March 14 
(1951?) to discuss “operational requirements for highly specialized 
interrogation teams.” In this memorandum, Edwards (n.d.) states that 
BLUEBIRD “is regarded as of the highest security classification and to be 
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known only to the fewest persons specifically designated by the Assistant 
Directors.” Edwards (n.d.) also wrote that he hoped that a “concurrence of 
opinion may be arrived at on a plan which can then be submitted for the 
required covert administrative support.” A subsequent memo also titled 
Project BLUEBIRD, written by Edwards to CIA Director Hillenkoetter has two 
dates, April 5, 1950 and a handwritten date of April 20, 1950. In the memo, 
Edwards requested direct approval from Hillenkoetter for the BLUEBIRD 
project due to its “extreme sensitivity and covert nature” (Director of Central
Intelligence 1950). Hillenkoetter stamped his approval on the BLUEBIRD 
project for the amount of $65, 515.00, which included salaries for two 
psychiatrists, drugs, a polygraph, and security. 
 One heavily redacted memo dated July 2, 1951 establishes that select 
PSB members had knowledge of BLUEBIRD. Located in the MKULTRA 
collection at Black Vault, the memo “lists all persons briefed on BLUEBIRD.” 
In this blacked-out memo, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, first chairman of the 
PSB who relieved Rear Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter as DCI (an agency 
member of the PSB when it was established), is visibly marked as briefed on 
the BLUEBIRD (Memorandum 1951). Other names shine through on the 
redacted memo: J.H. Alberti, Allen W. Dulles, and Richard Helms were 
briefed, as was Frank Wisner of OPC38 and Col. Sheffield Edwards, CIA's Chief
of Inspection and Security39; Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., CIA Inspector 
General, and John S. Earman, who as previously discussed, was to become 
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CIA IG, were briefed.40 Hillenkoetter, who clearly approved BLUEBIRD, and a 
number of other individuals listed on the memo including Earman, followed 
protocols of concealment and compartmented communications in restricting 
the larger PSB and agency members to the Board from learning of the 
project. Based on this memo, we can identify too that Mr. Earman, true to 
secrecy's embodiment in compartmentalization, remained silent on 
BLUEBIRD in his 1963 MKULTRA report. 
In a memorandum dated March 17, 1951, Assistant Deputy for 
Inspection and Security Col. Sheffield Edwards (1951) laid out the 
compartmented “special handling” procedures for documents on the 
BLUEBIRD program. BLUEBIRD documents were classified TOP SECRET and 
hand carried from one office to another “on a EYES ONLY basis.” Documents, 
wrote Edwards (1951), could be classified as SECRET if they did “not specify 
the true purpose of the program.” In addition to these security measures, a 
“control list” was established “for all persons who need to know and are 
briefed on this project” (Edwards 1951). It is not clear if any PSB staff 
appeared on the control list, nor is it certain if the list remains classified.
The redacted July 25, 1951 memo titled Meeting with IAC 
Representatives of Project BLUEBIRD (1951) concerns “protection for our 
personnel against Soviet interrogation techniques.”41 The IAC, or the 
Intelligence Advisory Committee (1948-1954), grew from the Intelligence 
Advisory Board and was chaired by the DCI. Members included 
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interdepartmental intelligence staff from State, the Atomic Energy 
Commission, Joint Chiefs, Army, Navy, and Air Force (Warner 1994; Keane 
and Warner 2007).42 There are several compelling things about the IAC 
memo: first, the exclusion of PSB staff, and two, the briefing was given by 
the previously mentioned Mr. J.H. Alberti, who presented information on a 
“Navy research effort” at Bethesda that began in 1947 - possibly Project 
Chatter.43 Mr. Alberti, that is Jack Henry Alberti, was a senior interrogator in 
the Office of Naval Intelligence and portrayed in the WWII-era Naval 
Inspector General's report as a less than professional officer. The report, 
which outlined the debriefing and interrogations of captured German 
submarine personnel at the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 
describes Alberti as “an intelligence official...dressed as a lieutenant 
commander, USN, [sic who] had interrogated the U-873 commanding officer, 
Lieutenant Commander Steinhoff, in a humiliating manner” (Watterson 2014,
201). Steinhoff is described as “bloody and bruised” after two days of 
interrogation, and shortly after committed suicide (Paterson 2009, 60). 
Alberti was also accused of distributing “looted decorations and personal and 
public property to Prison personnel as he saw fit” (Naval Inspector General 
1945). The Navy IG concluded that Alberti's actions were in “direct violation 
of the Geneva Convention and the Chief of Naval Operations' directives” 
(Naval Inspector General 1945). Other reports of prisoner abuse included the
captured crew of U-546 (Paterson 2009, 55). Alberti responded to the 
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charges that he had not been involved in any “irregularities” (Paterson 2009,
61-63), but it remains that he came to the IAC meeting under a dark star, 
and the larger PSB was unaware of the briefing and Alberti's background.
 Additional information on the relationship between the PSB and 
BLUEBIRD is revealed in a May 13 memo from H. Marshall Chadwell (1953), 
Assistant Director, CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence, to DCI Allen W. 
Dulles. The memo, entitled Briefing for the Psychological Board, discusses 
secret research 
on a drug called "Seramin" (Lysergic Acid Diethylsmide, commonly 
called LSD). This drug is manufactured by Sandoz, Inc., Switzerland, 
and has been exported to the USSR. It causes temporary mental 
derangement. 
The memo advised DCI Dulles that
If one of our high government officials shows signs of a changed 
personality, steps should be taken to have him “confined to quarters” 
for at least 2h hours, as the drug above mentioned dissipates its effect 
in that period of time, provided no additional doses are administered. 
This, consequently, means that the food and liquids during this 2h hour
period must be very carefully watched.
In this memo, Chadwell (1953) briefed Dulles on “brain washing” and a 
“group of drugs which temporarily alter personality,” and went onto 
recommend that “it is felt that it is inadvisable to make any general release 
of information in regard to drugs with relation to 'brain washing.'" Attached 
to Chadwell's memo is a “Suggested Briefing” that perfectly illustrates how 
secrecy is partnered to compartmentalization. Chadwell (1953) cautions 
Dulles that
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In our opinion, the Psychological Strategy Board and the Intelligence 
Advisory Committee in executive session should be briefed only in 
general terms, with no reference to the specific drug described, and 
"no publicity" should be stressed. The attached memorandum is a 
suggested outline for your briefing of PSB. This matter has been 
coordinated with Col. Sheffield Edwards and Dr. Willis Gibbons.
As late as November 1953, CIA continued its planning of BLUEBIRD 
programmatic activities, which included “experimentation with the hypospray
as a surreptitious speech inducing means on unwilling subjects without the 
use of polygraph or further intravenous injection of drugs” (Central 
Intelligence Agency 1953b).44
The above-cited memos indicate the PSB was largely removed from full
awareness of BLUEBIRD activities. Moreover, it remains uncertain if select 
PSB members had knowledge or involvement with the BLUEBIRD Control 
Board (Central Intelligence Agency 1953a) or the CIA-funded Society for the 
Investigation of Human Ecology, which a redacted cable describes as a 
“cover mechanism” for numerous projects (Central Intelligence Agency 
1977a).45 It is also uncertain if the IAC had full access to BLUEBIRD 
information.
Project ARTICHOKE (1949-1956?)
ARTICHOKE is “the Agency cryptonym for the study and/or use of 
'special' interrogation methods and techniques. These 'special' interrogation 
methods have been known to include the use of drugs and chemicals, 
hypnosis, and 'total isolation,' a form of psychological harassment” (Central 
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Intelligence Agency 1975a; 1952). Polygraph testing was also the subject of 
study within the ARTICHOKE program (Central Intelligence Agency 1955).
In his testimony before the Select Committee on Intelligence (1977, 
43), DCI Admiral Stansfield Turner places ARTICHOKE “for a few years 
beginning in 1949 we assessed foreign research on LSD under Project 
ARTICHOKE because of concern that such drugs might be employed against 
Agency and other U.S. personnel.” Other accounts date Project ARTICHOKE 
operating from 1951-1955 (Albarelli 2009, 227, Scheflin and Opton 1978, 
210). However, the Church Committee pinpoints different dates for the 
inception and conclusion of the program:
In August 1951, the project was renamed ARTICHOKE...information 
about Project ARTICHOKE after the fall of 1953 is scarce. The CIA 
maintains that the project ended in 1956, but evidence suggests that 
Office of Security and Office of Medical Services use of "special 
interrogation" techniques continued for several years thereafter. 
(Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Activities 1976a, 387-388)46
The Church Committee identified that CIA's Office of Scientific 
Intelligence (OSI) “initially led BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE efforts.” In 1952, 
responsibility for ARTICHOKE was transferred from OSI to the Inspection and
Security Office (I&SO), the predecessor to the Office of Security (Senate 
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities 1976a, 388; Central Intelligence Agency 1975a). A 
January 1952 memo credits the I&SO, which organized “permanent teams to
apply ARTICHOKE methods” to assist the OSI in its coordination of 
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ARTICHOKE activities (Central Intelligence Agency 1952a). OSI was the 
“focal point for all information from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Veterans 
Administration, CIA FBI, Treasury Department, and private contractors 
(Central Intelligence Agency 1952a). The January memo reports that 
ARTICHOKE's focus was the “evaluation and development of any method by 
which we can get information from a person against his will and without his 
knowledge” (Central Intelligence Agency 1952a). In the memo, CIA 
bemoaned the “failure to get scientifically trained personnel in key positions 
in the project” and posed the question, “How could we counter such methods
if they were used against us?” 
A February 1952 memo further outlines the ARTICHOKE program “to 
develop electroshock and hypnosis techniques, drug techniques, neuro-
surgical techniques, psychological techniques based upon work [redacted] 
and develop rapid screening and selection techniques” (Research Projects 
1952). ARTICHOKE operations also included studies for inducing “triggers” 
for targeted assassination.47
Several memos suggest that while the PSB was generally aware of 
brainwashing claims, ARTICHOKE particulars are muted in official 
memorandums. For example, at a February 19, 1953 PSB meeting, Allen 
Dulles discusses a letter he received from Secretary of Defense Charles E. 
Wilson on the subject of publicly addressing Communist indoctrination and 
the alleged confessions of U.S. servicemen held in Korea. The minutes state:
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Mr. Wilson‘s letter on “brain washing” was discussed. Mr. Stassen 
expressed the view that a press release is not the best way to handle 
this, and suggested instead that a leading doctor or scientist might 
read a paper on the subject at a scientific conference, thus reducing 
Government attribution and still gaining wide publicity. Mr. Dulles 
indicated that CIA would get together everything available on the 
subject.48 (Central Intelligence Agency 1953c)
In his letter, Secretary Wilson (1953a) not only shared the Department
of Defense's disquietude over interrogation techniques used by Chinese 
Communists, but proposed a “counter propaganda” campaign. Wilson's 
memo is remarkable for its creative use of language, such as “mind murder” 
and “mendicide,” synonyms for psychological techniques to alter cognition, 
judgment, and behavior. Wilson reframes interrogation methods that result 
in “brainwashing” as a “'new' form of war crime”: 
In this connection I am enclosing copies of a proposed press release 
and background information summary developed in the Department of 
the Army, as well as a preliminary study outlining a possible counter 
propaganda program based upon charging the Communists with a 
'new' form of war crime, and a new refinement in atrocity techniques; 
namely, ”mind murder" or mendicide. (Wilson 1953a)49
A heavily redacted memo records a subsequent PSB meeting on 
February 26. In this memo, DCI Dulles reported the Board discussed Wilson's
press release The Utilization of Captured American Personnel as Vehicles of 
Communist Propaganda on the “brain washing question.” The meeting 
resulted in a request that Dulles contact Detlev Bronk, then president of 
Johns Hopkins University, “to see whether he would head up a panel of 
private consultants experienced in the appropriate fields which would issue a 
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statement in lieu of the Pentagon press release” (Central Intelligence Agency
1953d). Out of this discussion, the Board formed an Interdepartmental 
Working Committee composed of PSB members and personnel from CIA, 
Defense, and State that met March 3 to strategize on how to address 
Wilson's proposed press release. In a calculated March memo from Dulles to 
the Under Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the DCI 
challenges the efficacy of “brainwashing” and/or “mind control.” Dulles 
(1953) writes that 
 A quick search in CIA shows little scientific evidence to support 
brainwashing. There is rather massive evidence in the form of case 
reports and circumstantial evidence which leads to the conclusion that 
it is not a difficult matter, given the time, to force almost anyone to 
make an inaccurate statement, provided that the time at which the 
statement is to be made can be controlled and the individual is not 
required to continue his willingness to lie for a long period. 
One wonders if Dulles had openly discussed these particular CIA “findings” 
publicly if the brainwashing craze of the 1950s would have taken hold so 
firmly in the American psyche. Instead, fear and paranoia over Communist 
brainwashing became entrenched as conspiracy during the Cold War (Marks 
1979; also see Carruthers 1998).
Additional memos from 1953 include a report on the coordination of 
ARTICHOKE activities within the U.S. with the participation of the USDA 
(“enlisted to speed up the bringing into the United States botanicals”) and 
FDA, who was on standby to lend its labs and testing facilities “when and if 
necessary” (Central Intelligence Agency1953a). At this time, it remains 
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uncertain if the PSB had knowledge of these domestic activities or the use of 
ARTICHOKE techniques on individuals held in federal prisons (Central 
Intelligence Agency 1953e); it's also not clear if PSB had knowledge of the 
ARTICHOKE Committee, which maintained a compartmented relationship 
with personnel at Camp Detrick, and met once or twice a year “to discuss 
questions involving behavioral drugs” (Chamberlain 1975, 1124). 
In the Church Committee's questioning of Dr. Sidney Gottlieb as to 
“why information on the surreptitious administration of LSD” was not shared 
with the ARTICHOKE Committee, the scientist responded "I imagine the only 
reason would have been a concern for broadening the awareness of its 
existence" (Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities 1976a, 410).50 As this mini-case study 
illustrates, perhaps the same “concern” restricted information sharing 
between the PSB and CIA.
Project MKULTRA (1950-1970?)
Project MKULTRA is described as a R&D project involving the CIA and 
various branches of the military (Senate Committee on Human Resources 
1977).51 The “MKULTRA charter” included the investigation of “radiation, 
electroshock, various fields of psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and 
anthropology, graphology, harassment substances, and paramilitary devices 
and materials” (Earman 1963, 4). It is possible that MKULTRA included other 
subjects of intelligence interest to CIA. According to the testimony of Dr. 
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Charles F. Geschickter of the CIA and NIH-funded Geschickter Fund for 
Medical Research, research was conducted on amnesia induced by 
concussion, as well as “the use of radar to put monkeys to sleep...instead of 
Mickey Finn, they could put them under with radar directed toward the 
monkey brain” (Senate Committee on Human Resources 1977, 90).52 DCI 
Allen Dulles approved the MKULTRA project based on Richard Helms' 
recommendation that “security considerations precluded handling the project
through usual contractual agreements” (Senate Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities 1976a, 405-
6). “Established” CIA audit procedures were waived for MKULTRA (Earman 
1963, 8).53 
One account situates the inception of the MKULTRA program in 1950, 
“motivated largely in response to alleged Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean 
uses of mind-control techniques on U.S. prisoners of war in Korea” (Advisory 
Committee on Human Radiation Experiments 1995a, 185). However, the 
Church Committee notes that “because MKULTRA records were destroyed, it 
is impossible to reconstruct the operational use of MKULTRA materials by the
CIA overseas; it has been determined that the use of these materials abroad 
began in 1953, and possibly as early as 1950” (Senate Select Committee to 
Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities 
1976a, 391). In testimony before the Senate Committee on Human 
Resources, Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research (1977), Sidney 
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Gottlieb shared that “several research inquiries – which much later came to 
be organized under the cryptonym MKULTRA - were begun around 1952.” 
Still another account reports the approval of the program by DCI Dulles on 
April 13, 1953 “along the lines proposed by ADDP Helms” (Senate Select 
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities 1976a, 390). CIA IG John S. Earman (1963) reports the program 
having a “ten year life,” that is, from 1953-1963.  
The Church Committee discusses MKULTRA in ratio with MKDELTA, with
MKULTRA as a R&D arm, while MKDELTA “denotes the DD/P” (Senate Select 
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities 1976a, 391; Earman 1963; Marks 1979, 61).54 MKDELTA was  
“established by CIA in October, 1952, for the use of biochemicals in 
clandestine operations,” and “may never have been implemented 
operationally” (General Counsel for the Department of Defense 1977). 
MKULTRA was renamed MKSEARCH in 1964 to continue as a testbed 
for “biological, chemical and radioactive material systems and techniques for 
producing predictable human behavioral and/o physiological changes in 
support of highly sensitive operational requirements” (Helms 1964). In 
changing the cryptonym for the project, Helms (1964) wrote that “after 
eleven years of experience with the MKULTRA mechanism, it is my belief that
the basic reasons for requesting waiver of standardized administrative 
controls over these sensitive activities are as valid today as they were in 
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April 1953.” In 1977, Adm. Turner testified that Geschickter continued his 
research on amnesia and sleep-producing drugs under the MKSEARCH 
program through July, 1967 at Georgetown University Hospital (Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence 1977). 
At the September 21 Senate Committee on Human Resources hearing, 
Sen. Edward M. Kennedy described MKULTRA, MKSEARCH, and 
MKCHICKWIT55 as being “turned on and turned off in a never-ending web, at 
least for that 20-year period of time” (Senate Committee on Human 
Resources 1977, 122). Kennedy characterized these programs as
various kinds of drug testing assuming different names; it is the 
MKULTRA, MKSEARCH, MKCHICKWIT, MKOFTEN.56 Whether they have 
“MK” before. them or not, there is a continuing program for a period of
some 21 years, up to 1973, with unwitting and, then, witting subjects. 
(Senate Committee on Human Resources 1977, 129)
As the PSB was not formally dissolved until September 1953, here I 
speculate that it is possible certain PSB members – Dulles aside - had 
awareness of these programs, and national security secrecy drove 
informational selectivity and circle of trust. 
Where the Past is the Present
 When I began this project some seven years ago, my research 
questions were simple: I was curious as to PSB's place within the history of 
U.S. psychological warfare efforts, its interactions with CIA under NSC 10/5, 
and knowledge of the Agency's three clandestine programs. During the 
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course of my research, I discovered the PSB did not uniformly offer approval 
to CIA for its clandestine and covert operations, and indeed, had uneven 
knowledge of the BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOKE, and MKULTRA programs. 
Consequently, these programs went unchallenged by the press, public, 
Congress, and perhaps sitting presidents. 
In addition to these findings, I stumbled on conflicting dates for the 
inception and termination of the BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOKE, and MKULTRA 
programs, which suggest alterations to the current historical record. True to 
secrecy as a parallel form of government, I identified institutional barriers 
that influence a comprehensive telling of the PSB and in general, the 
Intelligence Community's clandestine and covert programs. These barriers 
make history-building an often speculative, incomplete process. To this end, 
my goal in documenting the PSB's knowledge of CIA's BLUEBIRD, 
ARTICHOKE, and MKULTRA is to encourage direct engagement with the 
declassified archive as to make the invisible visible. Through encounters with
the past, we are better able to confront those elements of the administrative 
apparatus based in secrecy and deception that lead to the fracture of 
informed consent and infringe on the “right to responsible history” (De Baets
2008, 164). 
Sen. Edward M. Kennedy's measured comments during the Project 
MKULTRA hearings perfectly sum up the subterranean, rogue nature of the 
three CIA programs discussed in this article: 
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The intelligence community of this Nation, which requires a shroud
of secrecy in order to operate, has a very sacred trust from the 
American people. The CIA's program of human experimentation of the 
fifties and sixties violated that trust. It was violated again on the day 
the bulk of the agency's records were destroyed in 1973. It is violated 
each time a responsible official refuses to recollect the details of the 
program. The best safeguard against abuses in the future is a complete
public accounting of the abuses of the past. (Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence 1977, 3)
Sen. Kennedy's words are important for today's world, if for only the 
reminder that respect for civil liberties and human rights are the backbone of
just societies, not secrecy. This is not to say the use of national security 
secrecy isn't essential to the “pursuit of happiness” and security; quite the 
contrary. Secrecy “of various kinds is sometimes justified and even desirable 
in a democracy” (Thompson 1999, 192). But the use of secrecy is “justified 
only under carefully specified conditions, which ensure that the secrecy itself 
is subject to democratic accountability” (Thompson 1999, 192). 
As this case study of the PSB suggests, the “disfunctional excesses’’ of 
CIA deeply conflicts with the “norm of candor and sincerity” (Friedrich 1972, 
176, 179). Some sixty odd years after the dissolution of the PSB, we are left 
to conjecture if the Board might have exercised critical oversight of CIA had 
it had a stronger interpretation of NSC 10/5 and been a party to greater 
information sharing in the areas of clandestine and covert actions. We are 
instead left to further disentangle this research problem from the [redacted] 
archive.
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describes psychological warfare as “in the broad sense, consists of the application of the parts 
of  the science called psychology to the conduct of war; in the narrow sense, psychological 
warfare comprises the use of propaganda against an enemy, together with such military 
operational measures as may supplement the propaganda.” Since “World War II, U.S. military 
and NATO manuals have typically defined 'psychological warfare' or 'psychological operations' 
as tactics as varied as propaganda, covert operations, guerrilla warfare, and, more recently, 
public diplomacy” (Simpson 1994, 11). For other definitions, see Institute for Propaganda 
Analysis (1937) and Goldman and Maret (2016).
3 See National Security Act of 1947, sec. 201(a) and (b); the Establishment consisted of the 
Department of the Army, Navy, Air Forces, along with the National Security Council, Central 
Intelligence Agency, National Resources Security Board, Joint Chief of Staff, and other bodies. 
4 A memo from CIA Deputy Director/Intelligence Loftus E. Becker (1952) to the DDCI advises 
that CIA “must insist upon the excision” of statistics in the “Loomis report.” Further, Becker 
advises that Loomis' recommendations that the PSB be given authority by the NSC to 
coordinate government-wide “all basic social science research being carried an for 
Governmental purpose whether inside or outside the Government.” Henry Loomis, a PSB Staff 
Consultant, is identified in the minutes of the 15th meeting as the author of Report on social 
science research in Cold War operations (Psychological Strategy Board 1952h; also see 
Simpson 1994 and Price 2016).  One academic figure, philosopher Sidney Hook, appears to 
have corresponded with Gordon Gray. See the CREST database for letters.
5 Due to secrecy, we are left with a sparse understanding of PSB's involvement with planning 
“overt propaganda” during “general war” (Psychological Strategy Board 1951c,1951d) and 
“general hostilities” (Psychological Strategy Board 1951c, 1951f); PSB's involvement with the 
U.S. State Department's Voice of America (VOA) broadcasting system (Memorandum For: 
Chief, PY, 1952; Psychological Strategy Board 1952i) and operations pertaining to “literature as
an anti-Communist weapon” (Department of Defense 1952a) are also little discussed in the 
scholarly literature. In part, secrecy contributed to the concealment of PSB's Working 
Committee in addressing “germ warfare” allegations (Psychological Strategy Board 1952b; 
Central Intelligence Agency n.d.), its role in the “exploitation of Communist BW charges” during
the Korean War (Craig 1953), and the discrediting of the Needham committee or the 
International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial 
Warfare in Korea and China and its Report of the International Scientific Commission for the 
investigation of the facts concerning bacterial warfare in Korea and China (Psychological 
Strategy Board 1953c; Endicott and Hagerman 1998; Buchanan 2001). Also muddy is the 
PSB's involvement with “special measures to deal with 'brain washing'” of repatriated, 
“indoctrinated” servicemen who confessed to allegations the United States deployed biological 
weapons during the Korean War (Psychological Strategy Board 1953c).  
6 CIA's intelligence program between journalists, newspapers, and broadcasting companies. See 
Carl Bernstein, “CIA and the media,” Rolling Stone October 20, 1977, 
http://www.carlbernstein.com/magazine_cia_and_media.php; also see the Church Committee 
hearings, vol. 1.
7 There is some evidence that PSB did have a relationship with the Foundation as evidenced by 
C.D. Jackson's response to Nelson Rockefeller on International Information programs. The 
memo was reviewed by acting director of the PSB, George Morgan (Memorandum For 1953). 
Long after the PSB's demise, Psychological aspects of United States strategy panel report, a 
secret “group study” written by twelve contributors requested by Nelson Rockefeller to 
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participate, concluded that “psychological strategy is not a separate course of action but an 
integral component of all our policies and programs” (Anderson 1955). Among the twelve Panel
members were C.D. Jackson (who wears his Time, Inc. hat for the Panel) and Henry Kissinger. 
Full chapters by the participants appear in a more formal 223 page volume, found in CREST at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4.pdf
8 Clandestine is defined as an “operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments 
or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment”; clandestine is also defined as 
“any activity that is designed not to be detected by a local security service; a concealed, 
hidden, secret, or surreptitious operation conducted without the knowledge of anyone but the 
organization conducting the operation or investigation” (Goldman and Maret 2016). For 
definitions on covert operations, see the Department of Defense (DOD) Dictionary of military 
terms at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/c/47.html
9 That is, Hourcle (1993) uses the “secret island” metaphor to explain those individuals with 
security clearances that have access to classified national security information. Hourcle explains
this privilege creates “insular 'island-like' societies. A sea of requirements, including security 
clearances and 'need to know' restrictions, isolate people outside the 'secret island.'” Hourcle is 
important to my argument, but here the island metaphor goes deeper to include rogue 
elements who bypass official information policies in making decisions about the preservation of 
classified information.
10A redacted version of this memo is found in CIA's CREST at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80-01065A000500140033-2.pdf
11Barnes (1982, 668) notes that the OCB “gave formal approval to covert activities and its 
regular members were under-secretaries, underlining the importance with which these 
operations were viewed.”
12One might speculate too that “troll armies” (Benedictus 2016) and “micro-targeting” of voters 
in order to shape opinions in the 2016 election (Clarke 2017) have their roots in the 
psychological war between Cold War powers.
13  Such as the contemporary NSC's Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee that 
was “charged with coordinating interagency activities to ensure that all agencies work together 
and with the White House to develop and disseminate the President’s message to foreign 
audiences. As part of this effort, the group drafted a national communication strategy” (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office 2005, 10). The Committee “terminated with the departure of 
the then Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, who co-chaired the group, 
and the onset of the war in Iraq U.S. Government Accountability Office 2005, 10). In 2006, the 
Policy Coordinating Committee for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication (PCC) was 
established “as the principal interagency coordination body for U.S. government 
communications with foreign publics” (Nakamura and Weed 2009). 
More recently, the Countering disinformation and propaganda act (S.3274, included in the 2017
National Defense Authorization Act Conference Report) was signed into law by President Obama
on December 23, 2016. Countering Disinformation establishes the Global Engagement Center 
within the U.S. State Department; furthermore, the Act “will improve the ability of the United 
States to counter foreign propaganda and disinformation from our enemies by establishing an 
interagency center housed at the State Department to coordinate and synchronize counter-
propaganda efforts throughout the U.S. government. To support these efforts, the bill also 
creates a grant program for NGOs, think tanks, civil society and other experts outside 
government who are engaged in counter-propaganda related work” (press release, Sen. Rob 
Portman, R-OH, https://www.portman.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/12/president-signs-
portman-murphy-counter-propaganda-bill-into-law).
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14 And covert influence campaigns, “where you take information and wash it through third parties
- DC Leaks, Wikileaks and other for a - and push this information out not to learn about a 
society – that's espionage - but to change the society”; see Michael Hayden (2017). “Who 
hacked the DNC,” Cyberwar, October 10 (s02e02).
15For definitions, see the Dictionary of military and associated terms at 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/ and Goldman and Maret (2016). Also see 
Thornton (2015) and research of the period, for example, Schramm (1953).
16In 2015, Government Attic (2016) submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to the 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) for an inventory of records “withheld in 
full” in the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection. The President John F. Kennedy 
Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 mandated that “all assassination-related material 
be housed in a single collection at NARA.” See https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/
NARA will release Committee records in October, 2017 but in anticipation of the release, in 
February of 2017, I submitted a FOIA request for Dr. Sidney Gottlieb's October testimony to the
Committee in the hope of learning more about the PSB and BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOKE, and 
MKULTRA. CIA projects release of this information in 2018.
17In 1995, CIA, the National Archives, and presidential libraries “proposed to the intelligence and 
classifying community a cooperative interagency plan called the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) 
project. The purpose was to digitize all classified Presidential papers so that the scanned 
images could be brought to Washington, D.C for a declassification review by the equity-holding 
agencies.” See https://www.archives.gov/presidential-libraries/declassification/rac.html
18  Such as techniques outlined in the CIA's 1963 KUBARK counterintelligence interrogation 
manual (Blanton and Kornbluh 2014; McCoy 2007; Price 2016).
19This switch from State to the NSC is substantiated by the Church Committee, who wrote that 
by “supplanting an earlier board created in the Department of State under Assistant Secretary 
Edward W. Barrett, the new panel attempted to determine the psychological objectives of the 
United States and coordinated and evaluated the work of operating psychological warfare 
agencies” (Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities 1976c, 250). 
20NSC 10/2 “directed CIA to conduct 'covert' rather than merely 'psychological” operations,' 
defining them as all activities 'which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against 
hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are 
so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to 
unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any 
responsibility for them.' The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive 
included: 'propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, 
demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to 
underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [sic] groups, and 
support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such
operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-
espionage, and cover and deception for military operations'“ (U.S. State Department 2001). 
Also see the CIA memo titled Coordination and policy approval of covert operations January 4, 
1967, DOC 0000790232 at https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/coordination-
and-policy-approval-covert-operations
21A partial list, the PSB Task Panels include: A, which “reviewed US psychological programmes if 
the negotiation to end the Korean War were successful or if they broke down (Lucas 1996, 
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289), B (inventory of Cold War weapons), C, responsible for Cold War psychological planning, D
(Psychological Strategy Board 1952j), E, F, H,  Panel I (Southeast Asia), Panel J (economic 
security programs concerned with the Soviet orbit), Ad Hoc Panel L (“Psychological Implications
of Thermonuclear Tests”) and Panel M (doctrinal warfare) (Psychological Strategy Board 
1953b).
22Gray was Assistant Secretary and later Secretary of the Army. In 1950, he became president of
the University of North Carolina. See the Eisenhower Presidential Library finding aid on Gray at 
https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/finding_aids/g.html
Other PSB directors include Gen. Walter Bedell Smith “chairman of the PSB. The military 
adviser was Admiral Leslie Stevens. Gordon Gray was chosen to be director of the staff” 
(Montague 1992, 205). Subsequent PSB directors are Raymond B. Allen (“Dr. Allen Accepts 
Strategy Position” 1951), Adm. Alan G. Kirk (“Admiral Kirk's New Post” 1952), and C.D. 
Jackson, director in 1953 (Reston 1953). I couldn't locate records that substantiated Jackson's 
appointment.
23In select Board minutes, (e.g. 10th) PSB staff member names are redacted, as are CIA 
participants. In 2016, I submitted a successful MDR and received the PSB's Biographical 
Register for 1952 and 1953. In this article, I attempted to match names on the Register 
against numerous PSB and CIA documents. See 
https://bkofsecrets.files.wordpress.com/2017/02/bioregisterpsb_1952.pdf and 
https://bkofsecrets.files.wordpress.com/2017/02/bioregisterpsb_1953.pdf
24Membership of the President's Commission included former PSB director Gordon Gray, Gen. 
Robert Cutler, and C.D. Jackson, former OSS, publisher of Fortune, and speechwriter for Dwight
D. Eisenhower. Jackson was also an influential member of the PSB's successor, the Operations 
Coordinating Board. See Cook (1984) and John Allen Stern, C.D. Jackson: Cold War 
propagandist for democracy and globalism (University Press of America, 2012).
25Previous to its dissolution, C.D. Jackson (1953) recommended several projects to the PSB that 
included a “free world congress” where “representative citizens groups from all free nations 
would be present...the theme would be the true Peace Plan, as expressed in Eisenhower's 
“highway to peace.” Other projects included urging the Soviet Union to return all World War II 
prisoners, “introducing irrefutable scientific evidence of the colossal falsehood of the germ 
warfare charges” in Korea, and “calling upon the Soviets to lift the ban on the two way flow of 
newspapers, periodicals, and books” (Jackson 1953). 
26A search of CREST indicates that Morgan was acting director of PSB at least until September, 
1953, around the time of the Board was abolished. Also see note 22.
27As proposed by Lt. Geiger (Air Force) in August 1952, and reported in a redacted memo from 
the Operations Coordination Branch, Psychological Staff Division to the PSB, “This type of 
warfare is “primarily intended as a means of undermine collective emotional stability” (Central 
Intelligence Agency 1952c). The memo expresses the refinement of “definition of techniques” 
and issued a call for the “services of a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist, a cultural 
anthropologist, and a psychological warfare operator must be employed in a combined effort.” 
The Psychological Staff Division was the “responsible office for the conduct for NSC 10/2” 
between the PSB and CIA (Central Intelligence Agency 1952b). 
28  Executive Order 13526 governs the declassification of nonexempt “historically valuable 
records” 25 years or older; systematic declassification is required for those records exempted 
from automatic declassification and discretionary declassification is “conducted when the public 
interest in disclosure outweighs the need for continued classification or when an agency 
determines the information no longer requires protection and can be declassified earlier” (ISOO
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2016). The Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel or ISCAP, “acts as the appellate 
authority for classification and declassification decisions” when specific records are requested 
by the public. This is termed Mandatory Declassification Review or MDR” (ISOO 2016).
29See the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), which began to release 
previously classified documents and audio in July, 2017, https://www.archives.gov/press/press-
releases/2017/nr17-68
30 Correspondence with Mr. Randy Sowell, archivist, Truman Presidential Library. Also see CIA v. 
Sims 471 U.S. 159 (1985), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/471/159/ 
in which the Supreme Court ruled that CIA could withhold information via FOIA Exemption 3 
concerning government-sponsored programs such as MKULTRA. The justification for this ruling 
was that information could reveal intelligence sources specifically protected from disclosure 
under the National Security Act of 1947.
31  When asked by the Select Committee about the regularity of the procedure by which he 
authorized Dr. Gottlieb to destroy the MKULTRA records, Helms responded: "Well, that's hard to
say whether it would be part of the regular procedure or not, because the record destruction 
program is conducted according to a certain pattern. There's a regular record destruction 
pattern in the Agency monitored by certain people and done a certain way. So that anything 
outside of that, I suppose, would have been unusual. In other words, there were documents 
being destroyed because somebody had raised this specific issue rather than because they 
were encompassed in the regular records destruction program. So I think the answer to your 
question is probably yes" (Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Activities 1976a, 404; Helms testimony, 9/11/75, 6).
32The burning of ninety-two interrogation videotapes in 2005 is a more recent example of this 
type of destruction policy. The destruction of the tapes was authorized by Jose Rodriguez Jr., 
head of CIA's Directorate of Operations. The U.S. Department of Justice conducted a three year
investigation, but did not press criminal charges (Markon 2010). This destruction, along with 
the return of all copies of the classified report on torture to the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence (and hence making the report not available through FOIA), is the dark side of 
information policy – and what Friedrich (1972) classifies as “disfunctional” secrecy.
33The Memo is a redacted 11 page document that includes additional memos of various dates 
and subjects. It is assigned Document Number/ESDN of CIA-RDP83-01042R000800010005-9. 
The same Document Number/ESDN is listed on the “Senate Select Committee Request 
(Artichoke/Bluebird). See https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83-
01042r000800010005-9
34 Lashbrook was a DOD chemist and a major figure in the Frank Olson suicide (Albarelli 2010).
35See Adm. Stansfield Turner's testimony (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 1977, 8-51).
36  Turner's inventory comes to 74, not 86 institutions.
37I sent several emails to Black Vault asking the origin of these documents. As of press time, I 
hadn't received a reply.
38  There remain questions as to the participation of OPC staff such as Wisner (Asst. Director for 
Policy Coordination, 1948-1951) in the three programs, as well as the relationship between 
OPC and CIA internal divisions involved with programmatic R&D (e.g., Office of Scientific 
Intelligence, Inspection and Security Office, and Office of Security), and their relationship to 
the PSB. 
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39Col. Edwards became the civilian Director of CIA's Office of Security in 1953. See CIA-RDP78-
04718A000200110041-4, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-
04718a000200110041-4
40 Marks (1979, 108) recounts Earman's investigation of safehouses used during the MKULTRA 
program. However, in light of the BLUEBIRD briefing, there are questions as to what knowledge
Earman deliberately omitted and chose not to share regarding predecessor projects in his IG 
report on MKULTRA. 
41  I obtained this document under FOIA from CIA, February, 2017.
42We know the IAC regularly cited the Third Agency Rule “as a basis for refusing to give 
intelligence to CIA” (Keane and Warner 2007, 30). It is important to ask here if the PSB was 
the subject to the Rule by the very agencies in which it was charged to coordinate psychological
warfare activities.
  
43  The Church Committee described Chatter as beginning in the fall of 1947 and “responding to 
reports of 'amazing results' achieved by the Soviets in using 'truth drugs,' the program focused 
on the identification and testing of such drugs for use in interrogations and in the recruitment 
of agents. The research included laboratory experiments on animals and human subjects 
involving Anabasis aphylla, scopolamine, and mescaline in order to determine their speech-
inducing qualities. Overseas experiments were conducted as part of the project. The project 
expanded substantially during the Korean War, and ended shortly after the war, in 1953” 
(Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities 1976a, 387). There is some evidence LSD was also tested; see Lysergic acid diethyl 
amide (LSD-25): A clinical-psychological study by Lt. Charles Savage, USN, that Black Vault 
obtained under FOIA: 
http://www.theblackvault.com/documents/biologicalweapons/chatter/navychatter.pdf
44  We may never know if the PSB' was aware of Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson's (1953b)
memorandum based on the 1947 Nuremberg Code. The Wilson memo offered guidance to 
researchers as to “legal capacity [of subjects] to give consent” and provided an ethical 
foundation for research and human experimentation in the areas of atomic, biological, and 
chemical warfare.
45  The Society was founded in 1954 by Harold G. Wolff, MD, “an expert on migraine headaches 
and pain,” who, along with Lawrence Hinkle, conducted brainwashing studies for CIA (Marks 
1979, 94; Price 1998).
46  The quote cited by the Committee is from a CIA memorandum to the Select Committee, 
"Behavioral drugs and testing,” 2/11/75, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities 1976a, 388.
47  See Central Intelligence Agency (1954). Former CIA agent Miles Copeland stated in a 1986 
interview published in Rolling Stone that “the congressional subcommittee which went into this 
sort of thing got only the barest glimpse.” I believe Copeland here refers to the Church 
Committee's Alleged assassination plots involving foreign leaders: Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence, interim report dated November 20, 
1975. https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/secret-agent-man-19860116
48Harold E. Stassen, Foreign Operations Administration, U.S. Department of State. See 
https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/stassen-harold-e
49The Dulles' (1953) memo portrays the Wilson letter in a more direct way, stating “charge the 
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enemy with using United States' prisoners of war for propaganda purposes and demand that 
U.S. prisoners of war who have confessed dropping bacteriological warfare bombs in Korea be 
brought into neutral territory for permanent internment until the end of hostilities.”
50  Further research is needed on secret CIA-Chemical Corps' joint research on the effects of LSD 
(Taylor and Johnson 1975; Advisory Committee on Human Experimentation 1995, 780-4; 
Moreno 1996). 
51  See various U.S. Chemical Corps documents (e.g., 1955) that pose questions as to the veracity
of such a relationship: 
https://rockymountainarsenalarchive.wordpress.com/2011/07/09/summarymajorevents/
52It is not clear from the hearings if these tests were part of MKULTRA or a project titled 
MKACTION, of which very little is found in CREST.
53  Data generated from the BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOKE, and MKULTRA programs was, in many cases,
published in the scholarly literature. For example, a bibliography compiled by the Society for 
the Investigation of Human Ecology (1960) on the subject of brainwashing, cites books, 
reports, and the journal and popular magazine literature from 1949 through 1960. A report 
titled Experimental Studies of Sensory Deprivation and Social Isolation, prepared for the Chief 
of Research and Development, Department of the Army, also cites research conducted during 
the 1950s-1960s by researchers associated with the trifecta BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOKE, and 
MKULTRA (Myers, et al 1966). These publications appear to verify testimony of Sidney Gottlieb 
that researchers involved in CIA-funded projects published their research in the open scholarly 
literature. Gottlieb stated that “to my recollection, in every case, the results of the related 
research were published. I should add 'where appropriate.' I cannot testify that everybody 
published everything they did” (Senate Committee on Human Resources 1977, 171). It is not 
clear if the PSB was aware of origins and/or publication of research produced from the three 
programs. 
54DD/P is the Deputy Directorate for Plans.
55A program to “identify drugs with behavioral effects” (Senate Committee on Human Resources 
1977, 151, 160).
56Described as an Army and CIA project (Senate Committee on Human Resources 1977, 127, 
149).
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